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Abstract
Each day, anti-virus companies receive tens of thou-
sands samples of potentially harmful executables.
Many of the malicious samples are variations of
previously encountered malware, created by their
authors to evade pattern-based detection. Dealing
with these large amounts of data requires robust,
automatic detection approaches.
This paper studies malware classification based on
call graph clustering. By representing malware sam-
ples as call graphs, it is possible to abstract cer-
tain variations away, and enable the detection of
structural similarities between samples. The ability
to cluster similar samples together will make more
generic detection techniques possible, thereby tar-
geting the commonalities of the samples within a
cluster.
To compare call graphs mutually, we compute pair-
wise graph similarity scores via graph matchings
which approximately minimize the graph edit dis-
tance. Next, to facilitate the discovery of similar
malware samples, we employ several clustering al-
gorithms, including k-medoids and DBSCAN. Clus-
tering experiments are conducted on a collection of
real malware samples, and the results are evaluated
against manual classifications provided by human
malware analysts.
Experiments show that it is indeed possible to ac-
curately detect malware families via call graph clus-
tering. We anticipate that in the future, call graphs
can be used to analyse the emergence of new mal-
ware families, and ultimately to automate imple-
mentation of generic detection schemes.
KEYWORDS: Call Graph, Clustering, DBSCAN,
Graph Edit Distance, Graph Matching, k-medoids
Clustering, Vertex Matching
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1 Introduction
Tens of thousands of potentially harmfull executa-
bles are submitted for analysis to data security
companies on a daily basis. To deal with these
vast amounts of samples in a timely manner, au-
tonomous systems for detection, identification and
categorization are required. However, in practice
automated detection of malware is hindered by code
obfuscation techniques such as packing or encryp-
tion of the executable code. Furthermore, cyber
criminals constantly develop new versions of their
malicious software to evade pattern-based detection
by anti-virus products [31].
For each sample a data security company receives,
it has to be determined whether the sample is
malicious or has been encountered before, possi-
bly in a modified form. Analogous to the human
immune system, the ability to recognize common-
alities among malware which belong to the same
malware family would allow anti-virus products to
proactively detect both known samples, as well
as future releases of the malware samples from
the family. To facilitate the recognition of simi-
lar samples or commonalities among multiple sam-
ples which have been subject to change, a high-level
structure, i.e. an abstraction, of the samples is re-
quired. One such abstraction is the call graph. A
call graph is a graphical representation of a binary
executable in which functions are modeled as ver-
tices, and calls between those functions as directed
edges [30].
This paper deals with mutual comparisons of mal-
ware via their call graph representations, and the
classification of structurally similar samples into
malware families through the use of clustering al-
gorithms. So far, only a limited amount of research
has been devoted to malware classification and iden-
tification using graph representations. Flake [11]
and later Dullien and Rolles [8] describe approaches
to finding subgraph isomorphisms within control
flow graphs, by mapping functions from one flow
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graph to the other. Functions which could not be
reliably mapped have been subject to change. Via
this approach, the authors of both papers can for
instance reveal differences between versions of the
same executable or detect code theft. Additionally,
the authors of [8] suggest that security experts could
save valuable time by only analyzing the differences
among variants of the same malware.
Preliminary work on call graphs specifically in the
context of malware analysis has been performed by
Carrera and Erde´lyi [5]. To speed up the process
of malware analysis, Carrera and Erde´lyi use call
graphs to reveal similarities among multiple mal-
ware samples. Furthermore, after deriving similar-
ity metrics to compare call graphs mutually, they
apply the metrics to create a small malware tax-
onomy using a hierarchical clustering algorithm.
Briones and Gomez [3] continued the work started
by Carrera and Erde´lyi. Their contributions mainly
focus on the design of a distributed system to com-
pare, analyse and store call graphs for automated
malware classification. Finally the first large scale
experiments on malware comparisons using real
malware samples were recently published in [17, 20].
Additionally, the authors of [17] describe techniques
for efficient indexing of call graphs in hierarchi-
cal databases to support fast malware lookups and
comparisons.
In this paper we explore the potentials of call
graph based malware identification and classifica-
tion. First call graphs are introduced in more detail
as well as graph similarity metrics to compare mal-
ware via their call graph representations in Sections
2 and 3. At the basis of call graph comparisons lay
graph matching algorithms. Exact graph match-
ings are expensive to compute, and hence we resort
to approximation algorithms (Sections 3, 4). Fi-
nally, in Section 5, the graph similarity metrics are
used for automated malware classification via clus-
tering algorithms on a collection of real malware
call graphs. A more extensive report on the work is
available in [20].
2 Introduction to Call Graphs
A call graph models a binary executable as a di-
rected graph whose vertices, representing the func-
tions the executable is composed of, are inter-
connected through directed edges which symbolize
function calls [30]. A vertex can represent either
one of the following two types of functions:
1. Local functions, implemented by the program
designer.
2. External functions: system and library calls.
Local functions, the most frequently occurring func-
tions in any program, are written by the program-
mer of the binary executable. External functions,
sub_4079C6
GetProcAddressGetModuleHandleA GetTickCount MessageBoxA
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sub_407D6A
HeapAlloc GetProcessHeap
sub_407D4E
sub_407D1C
start
GetCommandLineA
Figure 1: Example of a small malware call graph.
Function names starting with ’sub’ denote local
functions, whereas the remaining functions are ex-
ternal functions.
such as system and library calls, are stored in a li-
brary as part of an operating system. Contrary to
local functions, external functions never invoke lo-
cal functions.
Analogous to [17], call graphs are formally defined
as follows:
Definition 1. (Call Graph): A call graph is a
directed graph G with vertex set V=V(G), repre-
senting the functions, and edge set E=E(G), where
E(G) ⊆ V(G)×V(G), in correspondence with the
function calls.
Call graphs are generated from a binary exe-
cutable through static analysis of the binary with
disassembly tools [9]. First, obfuscation layers are
removed, thereby unpacking and, if necessary, de-
crypting the executable. Next, a disassembler like
IDA Pro [15] is used to identify the functions and
assign them symbolic names. Since the function
names of user written functions are not preserved
during the compilation of the software, random
yet unique symbolic names are assigned to them.
External functions, however, have common names
across executables. In case an external function is
imported dynamically, one can obtain its name from
the Import Address Table (IAT) [25, 23]. When,
on the other hand, a library function is statically
linked, the library function code is merged by the
compiler into the executable. If this is the case,
software like IDA Pro’s FLIRT [16] has to be used
to recognize the standard library functions and to
assign them the correct canonical names. Once all
functions, i.e. the vertices in the call graph, are iden-
tified, edges between the vertices are added, corre-
sponding to the function calls extracted from the
disassembled executable.
3 Graph Matching
3.1 Graph matching techniques
Detecting malware through the use of call graphs re-
quires means to compare call graphs mutually, and
ultimately, means to distinguish call graphs repre-
senting benign programs from call graphs derived
from malware samples. Mutual graph comparison
is accomplished with graph matching.
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Definition 2. (Graph matching): For two graphs,
G and H, of equal order, the graph matching prob-
lem is concerned with finding a one-to-one mapping
(bijection) φ : V (G) → V (H) that optimizes a cost
function which measures the quality of the mapping.
In general, graph matching involves discovering
structural similarities between graphs [27] through
one of the following techniques:
1. Finding graph isomorphisms
2. Detecting maximum common subgraphs
(MCS)
3. Finding minimum graph edit distances (GED)
An exact graph isomorphism for two graphs, G
and H , is a bijective function f(v) that maps the
vertices V (G) to V (H) such that for all i, j ∈ V (G),
(i, j) ∈ E(G) if and only if (f(i), f(j)) ∈ E(H) [36].
Detecting the largest common subgraph for a pair
of graphs is closely related to graph isomorphism as
it attempts to find the largest induced subgraph of
G which is isomorphic to a subgraph in H . Conse-
quently, one could interpret an exact graph isomor-
phism as a special case of MCS, where the common
subgraph encompasses all the vertices and edges in
both graphs. Finally, the last technique, GED, cal-
culates the minimum number of edit operations re-
quired to transform graph G into graph H .
Definition 3. (Graph edit distance): The graph
edit distance is the minimum number of elemen-
tary operations required to transform a graph G into
graph H. A cost is defined for each edit operation,
where the total cost to transform G into H equals
the edit distance.
Note that the GED metric depends on the choice
of edit operations and the cost involved with each
operation. Similar to [37, 27, 17], we only consider
vertex insertion/deletion, edge insertion/deletion
and vertex relabeling as possible edit operations.
We can now show that the MCS problem can be
transformed into the GED problem. Given is the
shortest sequence of edit operations ep which trans-
forms graphG into graphH , for a pair of unlabeled,
directed graphs G and H . Apply all the necessary
destructive operations, i.e. edge deletion and ver-
tex deletion, on graph G as prescribed by ep. The
maximum common subgraph of G and H equals
the largest connected component of the resulting
graph. Without further proof, this reasoning can
be extended to labeled graphs.
For the purpose of identifying, quantifying and
expressing similarities between malware samples,
both MCS and GED seem feasible techniques. Un-
fortunately, MCS is proven to be an NP-Complete
problem [14], from which the NP-hardness of GED
optimization follows by the prevous argument (The
latter result was first proven in [37] by a reduction
from the subgraph isomorphism problem). Since
exact solutions for both MCS and GED are compu-
tationally expensive to calculate, a large amount of
research has been devoted to fast and accurate ap-
proximation algorithms for these problems, mainly
in the field of image processing [13] and for bio-
chemical applications [26, 35]. The remainder of
this Subsection serves as a brief literature review of
different MCS and GED approximation approaches.
A two-stage discrete optimization approach for
MCS is designed in [12]. In the first stage, a greedy
search is performed to find an arbitrary common
subgraph, after which the second stage executes a
local search for a limited number of iterations to
improve upon the graph discovered in stage one.
Similarly to [12], the authors of [35] also rely on
a two-stage optimization procedure, however con-
trary to [12], their algorithm tolerates errors in the
MCS matching. A genetic algorithm approach to
MCS is given in [34]. Finally, a distributed tech-
nique for MCS based on message passing is provided
in [2].
A survey of three different approaches to perform
GED calculations is conducted by Neuhaus, Riesen,
et. al. in [27, 28, 24]. They first give an exact
GED algorithm using A* search, but this algo-
rithm is only suitable for small graph instances [24].
Next, A*-Beamsearch, a variant of A* search which
prunes the search tree more rigidly, is tested. As
is to be expected, the latter algorithm provides
fast but suboptimal results. The last algorithm
they survey uses Munkres’ bipartite graph matching
algorithm as an underlying scheme. Benchmarks
show that this approach, compared to the A*-search
variations, handles large graphs well, without af-
fecting the accuracy too much. In [18], the GED
problem is formulated as a Binary Linear Program,
but the authors conclude that their approach is not
suitable for large graphs. Nevertheless, they de-
rive algorithms to calculate respectively the lower
and upper bounds of the GED in polynomial time,
which can be deployed for large graph instances as
estimators of the exact GED. Inspired by the work
of Justice and Hero in [18], the authors of [37] devel-
oped new polynomial algorithms which find tighter
upper and lower bounds for the GED problem.
3.2 Graph similarity
In general, malware consists of multiple compo-
nents, some of which are new and others which are
reused from other malware [9]. The virus writer will
test his creations against several anti-virus prod-
ucts, making modifications along the way until the
anti-virus programs do not recognize the virus any-
more. Furthermore, at a later stage the virus writer
might release new, slightly altered, versions of the
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same virus [4, 32].
In this Section, we will describe how to determine
the similarity between two malware samples, based
on the similarity σ(G,H) of their underlying call
graphs. As will become evident shortly, the graph
edit distance plays an important role in the quan-
tification of graph similarity. After all, the extent to
which the malware writer modifies a virus or reuses
components should be reflected by the edit distance.
Definition 4. (Graph similarity): The similarity
σ(G,H) between two graphs G and H indicates the
extent to which graph G resembles graph H and vice
versa. The similarity σ(G,H) is a real value on
the interval [0,1], where 0 indicates that graphs G
and H are identical whereas a value 1 implies that
there are no similarities. In addition, the following
constraints hold: σ(G,H) = σ(H,G) (symmetry),
σ(G,G) = 0, and σ(G,K0) = 1 where K0 is the
null graph, G 6= K0.
Before we can attend to the problem of graph
similarity, we first have to revisit the definition of
a graph matching as given in the previous Sec-
tion. To find a bijection which maps the vertex
set V (G) to V (H), the graphs G and H have to
be of the same order. However, the latter is rarely
the case when comparing call graphs. To circum-
vent this problem, the vertex sets V (G) and V (H)
are supplemented with dummy vertices ǫ such that
the resulting sets V ′(G), V ′(H) are both of size
|V (G)+V (H)| [37, 17]. A mapping of a vertex v in
graph G to a dummy vertex ǫ is then interpreted as
deleting vertex v from graph G, whereas the oppo-
site mapping implies a vertex insertion into graph
H . Now, for a given graph matching φ, we can
define three cost functions: VertexCost, EdgeCost
and RelabelCost.
VertexCost The number of deleted/inserted ver-
tices: |{v : v ∈ [V ′(G) ∪ V ′(H)] ∧ [φ(v) =
ǫ ∨ φ(ǫ) = v]}|.
EdgeCost The number of unpreserved edges:
|E(G)|+ |E(H)| − 2× |{(i, j) : [(i, j) ∈ E(G)∧
(φ(i), φ(j)) ∈ E(H)]}|.
RelabelCost The number of mismatched func-
tions, i.e. the number of external functions in
G and H which are mapped against different
external functions or local functions.
The sum of these cost functions results in the graph
edit distance λφ(G,H):
λφ(G,H) = V ertexCost+EdgeCost+RelabelCost
(1)
Note that, as mentioned before, finding the mini-
mum GED, i.e. min
φ
λφ(G,H), is an NP-hard prob-
lem, but can be approximated. The latter is elabo-
rated in the next Subsection.
Finally, the similarity σ(G,H) of two graphs is
obtained from the graph edit distance λφ(G,H):
σ(G,H) =
λφ(G,H)
|V (G)|+ |V (H)|+ |E(G)| + |E(H)|
(2)
3.3 Graph edit distance approxima-
tion
Finding a graph matching φ which minimizes the
graph edit distance is proven to be an NP-Complete
problem [37]. Indeed, empirical results show that
finding such a matching is only feasible for low or-
der graphs, due to the time complexity [24]. In
[21, 20], the performance of several graph matching
algorithms for call graphs is investigated. Based on
the findings in [21], the fastest and most accurate
results are obtained with an adapted version of Sim-
ulated Annealing; a local search algorithm which
searches for a vertex mapping that minimizes the
GED. This algorithm turns out to be both faster
and more accurate than for example the algorithms
based on Munkres’ bipartite graph matching algo-
rithm as applied in the related works [37, 17]. Two
steps can be distinguished in the Simulated Anneal-
ing algorithm for call graph matching. In the first
step, the algorithm determines which external func-
tions a pair of call graphs have in common. These
functions are mapped one-to-one. Next, the re-
maining functions are mapped based on the out-
come of the Simulated Annealing algorithm, which
attempts to map the remaining functions in such a
way that the GED for the call graphs under con-
sideration is minimized. For more details, refer to
[21].
4 Clustering
Writing a malware detection signature for each in-
dividual malware sample encountered is a cumber-
some and time consuming process. Hence, to com-
bat malware effectively, it is desirable to identify
groups of malware with strong structural similari-
ties, allowing one to write generic signatures which
capture the commonalities of all malware samples
within a group. This Section investigates several
approaches to detect malware families, i.e. groups of
similar malware samples, via clustering algorithms.
4.1 k-medoids clustering
One of the most commonly used clustering tech-
niques is k-means clustering. The formal descrip-
tion of k-means clustering is summarized as follows
[1, 7]:
Definition 5. (k-means Clustering): Given a data
set χ, where each sample x ∈ χ is represented by a
4
vector of parameters, k-means clustering attempts
to group all samples into k clusters. For each clus-
ter Ci ∈ C, a cluster center µCi can be defined,
where µCi is the mean vector, taken over all the
samples in the cluster. The objective function of
k-means clustering is to minimize the total squared
Euclidean distance ||x−µCi ||
2 between each sample
x ∈ χ, and the cluster center µCi of the cluster the
sample has been allocated to:
min
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈Ci
||x− µCi ||
2
The above definition assumes that for each clus-
ter, it is possible to calculate a mean vector, the
cluster center (also known as centroid), based on
all the samples inside a cluster. However, with a
cluster containing call graphs, it is not a trivial pro-
cedure to define a mean vector. Consequently, in-
stead of defining a mean vector, a call graph inside
the cluster is selected as the cluster center. More
specifically, the selected call graph has the most
commonalities, i.e. the highest similarity, with all
other samples in the same cluster. This allows us
to reformulate the objective function:
min
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈Ci
σ(x, µCi )
where σ(G,H) is the similarity score of graphs G
and H as discussed in Section 3. The latter algo-
rithm is more commonly known as a k-medoids clus-
tering algorithm [19], where the cluster centers µCi
are referred to as ’medoids’. Since finding an exact
solution in accordance with the objective function
has been proven to be NP-hard [6], an approxima-
tion algorithm is used (Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1: The k-medoids clustering algo-
rithm
Input: Number of clusters k, set of call graphs
χ.
Output: A set of k clusters C
1 foreach Ci ∈ C do
2 Initialize µCi with an unused sample from
χ;
3 repeat
4 Classify the remaining |χ| − k call graphs.
Each sample x ∈ χ is put in the cluster
which has the most similar cluster medoid;
5 foreach Ci ∈ C do
6 Recompute µCi ;
7 until The objective function converges ;
8 return C = C0, C1, ..., Ck−1
In [22], a formal proof on the convergence of k-
means clustering with respect to its objective func-
tion is given. To summarize, the authors of [22]
prove that the objective function decreases mono-
tonically during each iteration of the k-means al-
gorithm. Because there are only a finite number
of possible clusterings, the k-means clustering al-
gorithm will always obtain a result which corre-
sponds to a (local) minimum of the objective func-
tion. Since k-medoids clustering is directly derived
from k-means clustering, the proof also applies for
k-medoids clustering.
To initialize the cluster medoids, we use three dif-
ferent algorithms. The first approach selects the
medoids at random from χ. Arthur and Vassilvit-
skii observed in their work [1] that k-means cluster-
ing, and consequently also k-medoids clustering, is a
fast, but not necessarily accurate approach. In fact,
the clusterings obtained through k-means cluster-
ing can be arbitrarily bad [1]. In their results, the
authors of [1] conclude that bad results are often
obtained due to a poor choice of the initial clus-
ter centroids, and hence they propose a novel way
to select the initial centroids, which considerably
improves the speed and accuracy of the k-means
clustering algorithm [1]. In summary, the authors
describe an iterative approach to select the medoids,
one after another, where the choice of a new medoid
depends on the earlier selected medoids. For a de-
tailed description of their k-means++ algorithm,
refer to [1]. Finally, the last algorithm to select the
initial medoids will be used as a means to assess
the quality of the clustering results. To assist the
k-medoids clustering algorithm, the initial medoids
are selected manually by anti-virus analysts. We
will refer to this initialization technique as ”Trained
initialization”.
4.1.1 Clustering performance analysis
In this Subsection, we will test and investigate the
performance of k-medoids clustering, in combina-
tion with the graph similarity scores obtained via
the GED algorithm discussed in Section 3. The
data set χ we use consists of 194 malware call graph
samples which have been manually classified by an-
alysts from F-Secure Corporation into 24 families.
Evaluation of the cluster algorithms is performed
by comparing the obtained clusters against these
24 partitions. To get a general impression of the
samples, the call graphs in our test set contain on
average 234 nodes and 488 edges. The largest sam-
ple has 748 vertices and 1875 edges. Family sizes
vary from 2 samples to 17 unique call graph sam-
ples.
Before k-medoids clustering can be applied on the
data collection, we need to select a suitable value
for k. Let koptimal be the natural number of clus-
ters present in the data set. Finding koptimal is not
a trivial task, and is analysed in depth in the next
Subsection. For now, we assume that koptimal = 24;
the number of clusters obtained after manual clas-
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sification. Note however that koptimal depends on
the cluster criteria used to obtain a clustering. In
Figure 2, the average distance d¯(xi, µCi) between
a sample xi in cluster Ci and the medoid of that
cluster µCi is plotted against the number of clus-
ters in use. Each time k-medoids clustering is re-
peated, the algorithm could yield a different cluster-
ing due to the randomness in the algorithm. Hence,
for a given number of clusters k, we run k-medoids
clustering 50 times, and average d¯(xi, µCi). When
comparing the different initilization methods of k-
medoids clustering, based on Figure 2, one can in-
deed conclude that k-means++ yields better re-
sults than the randomly initialized k-medoids algo-
rithm because k-means++ discovers tighter, more
coherent clusters. Furthermore, the best results are
obtained with Trained clustering where a member
from each of the 24 predetermined malware families
are chosen as the initial cluster medoids.
Figures 3a, 3b depict heat maps of two possible clus-
terings of the sample data. Each square in the heat
map denotes the presence of samples from a given
malware family in a cluster. As an example, cluster
0 in figure 3a comprises 86% Ceeinject samples, 7%
Runonce samples and 7% Neeris samples. The fam-
ily names are invented by data security companies
and serve only as a means to distinguish families.
Figure 3a shows the results of k-medoids cluster-
ing with Trained initialization. The initial medoids
are selected by manually choosing a single sample
from each of the 24 families identified by F-Secure.
The clustering results are very promising: nearly
all members from each family end up in the same
cluster (Figure 3a). Only a few families, such as
Baidu and Boaxxe, are scattered over multiple clus-
ters. Figure 3b shows the clustering results of k-
means++ 1. Clearly, the clusterings are not as ac-
curate as with our Trained k-medoids algorithm;
samples from different families are merged into the
same cluster. Nevertheless, in most clusters samples
originating from a single family are prominently
present. Yet, before one can conclude whether k-
means++ clustering is a suitable algorithm to per-
form call graph clustering, one first needs an au-
tomated procedure to discover, or at the minimum
estimate with reasonable accuracy, koptimal. The
latter issue is investigated in the next Subsection.
4.2 Determining the number of clus-
ters
The k-medoids algorithm requires the number of
clusters the algorithm should deliver as input. Two
quality metrics are used to analyse the natural num-
ber of clusters, koptimal, in the sample set: Sum of
1A similar figure for randomly initialized k-medoids clus-
tering is omitted due to its reduced accuracy with respect to
k-means++.
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Figure 2: Quality of clusters. The average distance
d¯(xi, µCi) between a sample xi in cluster Ci and the
cluster’s medoid µCi is averaged over 50 executions
of the k-means algorithm.
Error and the silhouette coefficient. For a more
elaborate discussion, and additional metrics, refer
to [20].
4.2.1 Sum of (Squared) Error
The Sum of Error (SEp), measures the total
amount of scatter in a cluster. The general formula
of SEp is:
SEp =
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈Ci
(d(xi, µCi))
p (3)
In this equation, d(x, y) is a distance metric which
measures the distance between a sample and its
corresponding cluster centroid (medoid) as a pos-
itive real value. Here we choose d(xi, µCi) = 100×
σ(xi, µCi).
Ideally, when one plots SEp against an increasing
number of clusters, one should observe a quick de-
creasing SEp on the interval [k = 1, koptimal] and a
slowly decreasing value on the interval [koptimal, k =
|χ|] [33].
4.2.2 Silhouette Coefficient
The average distance between a sample and its clus-
ter medoid measures the cluster cohesion [33]. The
cluster cohesion expresses how similar the objects
inside a cluster are. The cluster separation on the
other hand reflects how distinct the clusters are mu-
tually. An ideal clustering results in well-separated
(non-overlapping) clusters with a strong internal co-
hesion. Therefore, koptimal equals the number of
clusters which maximizes both cohesion and sepa-
ration. The notions of cohesion and separation can
be combined into a single function which expresses
the quality of a clustering: the silhouette coefficient
[33, 29].
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(a) trained k-medoids clustering.
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(b) k-means++ clustering
Figure 3: Heat maps depicting non-unique cluster-
ings of 194 samples in 24 clusters. The color of a
square depicts the extent to which a certain family
is present in a cluster.
For each sample xi ∈ χ, let a(xi) be the average
similarity of sample xi ∈ Ck in cluster Ck to all
other samples in cluster Ck:
a(xi) =
∑
xj∈Ck
σ(xi, xj)
|Ck| − 1
(xi ∈ Ck)
Furthermore, let bk(xi), xi /∈ Ck be the average sim-
ilarity from sample xi to a cluster Ck which does not
accommodate sample xi.
bk(xi) =
∑
xj∈Ck
σ(xi, xj)
|Ck|
(xi /∈ Ck)
Finally, b(xi) equals the minimum such b
k(xi):
b(xi) = min
k
bk(xi) k ∈ {0, 1, .., |C|}
The cluster for which bk(xi) is minimal, is the sec-
ond best alternative cluster to accommodate sample
xi. From the discussion of cohesion and separation,
it is evident that for each sample xi, it is desirable
to have a(xi)≪ b(xi) so to obtain a clustering with
tight, well-separated clusters.
The silhouette coefficient of a sample xi is defined
as:
s(xi) =
b(xi)− a(xi)
max(a(xi), b(xi))
(4)
It is important to note that s(xi) is only defined
when there are 2 or more clusters. Furthermore,
s(xi) = 0 if sample xi is the only sample inside its
cluster [29].
The silhouette coefficient s(xi) in Equation 4
always yields a real value on the interval [−1, 1].
To measure the quality of a cluster, the average
silhouette coefficient over the samples of the re-
spective cluster is computed. An indication of the
overall clustering quality is obtained by averaging
the silhouette coefficient over all the samples in χ.
To find koptimal, one has to search for a clustering
that yields the highest silhouette coefficient.
For a single sample xi, s(xi) reflects how well the
sample is classified. Typically, when s(xi) is close
to 1, the sample has been classified well. On the
other hand, when s(xi) is a negative value, then
sample xi has been classified into the wrong cluster.
Finally, when s(xi) is close to 0, i.e. a(xi) ≈ b(xi),
it is unclear to which cluster sample xi should
belong: there are at least two clusters which could
accommodate sample xi well.
4.2.3 Experimental results
The SEp and silhouette coefficients obtained after
clustering the 194 malware samples for various
numbers of clusters are depicted in Figure 4.
Since the results of the clustering are subject
to the randomness in k-medoids clustering, each
clustering is repeated 10000 times, and the best
obtained results are used in Figure 4. Interestingly,
the SEp curves for different values of p in Figure
4a do not show an evident value for koptimal.
Similarly, no clear peak in the silhouette plot
(Figure 4b) is visible either, making it impossible
to derive koptimal. Consequently, using a k-means
based algorithm, it is not possible to partition all
samples in cohesive, well-separated clusters based
on the graph similarity scores, such that the result
corresponds with the manual partitioning of the
samples by F-Secure. Furthermore, experimental
results show that for some samples it is unclear to
which cluster they should be assigned too, hence
making it difficult to automatically reproduce the
24 clusters as proposed by F-Secure.
4.3 DBSCAN clustering
In the previous Section, we have concluded that the
entire sample collection cannot be partitioned in
well-defined clusters, such that each cluster is both
tight and well-separated, using a k-means based
clustering algorithm. Central to the k-medoid clus-
tering algorithm stands the selection of medoids.
A family inside the data collection is only correctly
identified by k-medoids if there exists a medoid with
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Figure 4: Finding koptimal in the set with 194 pre-
classified malware samples.
a high similarity to all other samples in that family.
This, however, is not necessary the case with mal-
ware. Instead of assuming that all malware sam-
ples in a family are mutually similar to a single
parent sample, it is more realistic to assume that
malware evolves. In such an evolution, malware
samples from one generation are based on the sam-
ples from the previous generation. Consequently,
samples in generation n likely have a high similar-
ity to samples in generation n + 1, but samples in
generation 0 are possibly quite different from those
in generation n, n ≫ 0. This evolution theory sug-
gests that there are no clusters where the samples
are positioned around a single center in a spheri-
cal fashion, which makes it much harder for a k-
means based clustering algorithm to discover clus-
ters. Although the k-medoids algorithms failed to
partition all 194 samples in well defined clusters,
both Figure 3a and Figure 3b nevertheless reveal a
strong correspondence between the clusters found
by the k-medoids algorithm and the clusters as pre-
defined by F-Secure. This observation motivates us
to investigate partial clustering of the data which
discards samples for which it is not clear to which
cluster or family they belong. For this purpose,
we apply the Density-Based Spatial Clustering of
Applications with Noise (DBSCAN) clustering al-
gorithm [33, 10]. DBSCAN clustering searches for
dense areas in the data space, which are separated
by areas of low density. Samples in the low den-
sity areas are considered noise and are therefore dis-
carded, thereby ensuring that the clusters are well-
separated. An advantage of DBSCAN clustering is
that the high density areas can have an arbitrary
shape; the samples do not necessarily need to be
grouped around a single center.
To separate areas of low density from high density
areas, DBSCAN utilizes two parameters: MinPts
and Rad. Using these parameters, DBSCAN is
able to distinguishes between three types of sam-
ple points:
• Core points: Pc = {x ∈ χ, |NRad(x)| >
MinPts}, where
NRad(x) = {y ∈ χ, σ(x, y) ≤ Rad}
• Border points: Pb = {x ∈ (χ\Pc), ∃y ∈ Pc :
σ(x, y) ≤ Rad}
• Noise points: Pn = χ\(Pc ∪ Pb)
An informal description of the DBSCAN clustering
algorithm is given in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: DBSCAN clustering algorithm
Input: Set of call graphs χ, MinPts, Rad
Output: Partial clustering of χ
1 Classify χ in Core points, Border points and
Noise;
2 Discard all samples classified as noise;
3 Connect all pairs (x, y) of core points with
σ(x, y) ≤ Rad;
4 Each connected structure of core points forms
a cluster;
5 For each border point identify the cluster
containing the nearest core point, and add the
border point to this cluster;
6 return Clustering
The question now arises how to select the pa-
rametersMinPts and Rad. Based on experimental
results, the authors of [10] find MinPts = 4 to be
a good value in general. To determine a suitable
value for Rad, the authors suggest to create a graph
where the samples are plotted against the distance
(similarity) to their k-nearest neighbor in ascend-
ing order. Here k equals MinPts. The reasoning
behind this procedure is as follows: Core or Border
points are expected to have a nearly constant simi-
larity to their k-nearest neighbor, assuming that k
is smaller than the size of the cluster the point re-
sides in, and that the clusters are roughly of equal
density. Noise points, on the contrary, are expected
to have a relatively larger distance to their k-nearest
neighbor. The latter change in distance should be
reflected in the graph, since the distances are sorted
in ascending order.
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Figure 5: Finding Rad and MinPts
Figure 5a shows the similarity of our malware sam-
ples to their k-nearest neighbors, for various k. Ar-
guably, one can observe rapid increases in slope
both at Rad = 2.2 and Rad = 4.8 for all k. A
Rad = 4.8 radius can be considered too large to
apply in the DBSCAN algorithm since such a wide
radius would merge several natural clusters into a
single cluster. Even though Rad = 2.2 seems a
plausible radius, it is not evident from Figure 5a
which value of Minpts should be selected. To cir-
cumvent this issue, DBSCAN clustering has been
performed for a large number of Minpts and Rad
combinations (Figure 5b). For each resulting par-
titioning, the quality of the clusters has been es-
tablished with the silhouette coefficient. From Fig-
ure 5b one can observe that the best clustering is
obtained for Minpts = 3 and Rad = 0.3. While
comparing Figure 5b against Figure 5a, it is not ev-
ident why Rad = 0.3 is a good choice. We however
believe that the silhouette coefficient is the more
descriptive metric.
Finally, Figure 6 gives the results of the DBSCAN
algorithm for Minpts = 3 and Rad = 0.3 in a fre-
quency diagram. Each colored square gives the fre-
quency of samples from a given family present in
a cluster. The top two rows of the diagram rep-
resent respectively the total size of the family, and
the number of samples from a family which were
categorized as noise. For example, the Boaxxe fam-
ily contains 17 samples in total, which were divided
over clusters 1 (14 samples), 6 (1 sample), and 17
(2 samples). No samples of the Boaxxe family were
classified as noise. The observation that the Boaxxe
family is partitioned in multiple clusters is anal-
ysed in more detail; closer analysis of this family
revealed that there are several samples within the
family with a call graph structure which differs sig-
nificantly from the other samples in the family.
The results from the DBSCAN algorithm on the
malware samples are very promising. Except 3 clus-
ters, each cluster identifies a family correctly with-
out mixing samples from multiple families. Fur-
thermore, the majority of samples originating from
larger families were classified inside a cluster and
hence were not considered noise. Families which
contain fewer thanMinpts samples are mostly clas-
sified as noise (e.g. Vundo, Blebloh, Startpage, etc),
unless they are highly similar to samples from dif-
ferent families (e.g. Autorun). Finally, only the
larger families Veslorn (8 samples) and Redosdru
(9 samples) were fully discarded as noise. Closer
inspection of these two families indeed showed that
the samples within the families are highly dissimilar
from a call graph perspective.
Finally, Figure 7 depicts a plot of the diameter and
the cluster tightness, for each cluster in Figure 6.
The diameter of a cluster is defined as the similarity
of the most dissimilar pair of samples in the cluster,
whereas the cluster tightness is the average similar-
ity over all pairs of samples. Most of the clusters
are found to be very coherent. Only for clusters
2, 6, and 7, the diameter differs significantly from
the average pairwise similarity. For clusters 2 and 6,
this is caused by the presence of samples from 2 dif-
ferent families which are still within Rad distance
from each other. Cluster 7 is the only exception
where samples are fairly different and seem to be
modified over multiple generations. Lastly, a spe-
cial case is cluster 16, where the cluster diameter
is 0. The call graphs in this cluster are isomorphic;
one cannot distinguish between these samples based
on their call graphs, even though they come from
different families. Closer inspection of the samples
in cluster 16 by F-Secure Corporation revealed that
the respective samples are so-called ’droppers’. A
dropper is an installer which contains a hidden mali-
cious payload. Upon execution, the dropper installs
the payload on the victim’s system. The samples in
cluster 16 appear to be copies of the same dropper,
but each with a different malicious payload. Based
on these findings, the call graph extraction has been
adapted such that this type of dropper is recognized
in the future. Instead of creating the call graph from
the possibly harmless installer code, the payload is
extracted from the dropper first, after which a call
graph is created from the extracted payload.
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Figure 6: DBSCAN clustering with Minpts = 3,
Rad = 0.3. The colors depict the frequency of oc-
currence of a malware sample from a certain family
in a cluster.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, automated classification of malware
into malware families has been studied. First, met-
rics to express the similarities among malware sam-
ples which are represented as call graphs have been
introduced, after which the similarity scores are
used to cluster structurally similar malware sam-
ples. Malware samples which are found to be very
similar to known malicious code, are likely muta-
tions of the same initial source. Automated recog-
nition of similarities as well as differences among
these samples will ultimately aid and accelerate the
process of malware analysis, rendering it no longer
necessary to write detection patterns for each indi-
vidual sample within a family. Instead, anti-virus
engines can employ generic signatures targeting the
mutual similarities among samples in a malware
family.
After an introduction of call graphs in Section 2
and a brief description on the extraction of call
graphs from malware samples, Section 3 discusses
methods to compare call graphs mutually. Graph
similarity is expressed via the graph edit distance,
which, based on our experiments, seems to be a vi-
able metric. To facilitate the discovery of malware
families, Section 4 applies several clustering algo-
rithms on a set of malware call graphs. Verification
of the classifications is performed against a set of
194 unique malware samples, manually categorized
in 24 malware families by the anti-virus company
F-Secure Corporation. The clustering algorithms
used in the experiments include various versions of
the k-medoids clustering algorithm, as well as the
DBSCAN algorithm. One of the main issues en-
countered with k-medoids clustering is the specifi-
cation of the desired number of clusters. Metrics to
determine the optimal number of clusters did not
yield conclusive results, and hence it followed that
k-means clustering is not effective to discover mal-
ware families.
Much better results on the other hand are obtained
with the density-based clustering algorithm DB-
SCAN; using DBSCAN we were able to success-
fully identify malware families. At the date of writ-
ing, automated classification is also attempted on
larger data sets consisting of a few thousand sam-
ples. However, manual analysis of the results is a
time consuming process, and hence the results could
not be included in time in this paper. Future goals
are to link our malware identification and family
recognition software to a live stream of incoming
malware samples. Observing the emergence of new
malware families, as well as automated implementa-
tion of protection schemes against malware families
belong to the long term prospects of malware de-
tection through call graphs.
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